In economic literature much emphasis is put into considering what are the most useful actions given a standard game. The game is defined by a set of utilities and the interest is to deduce what are the most useful action that an agent can take. Concepts like the Nash equilibrium arise where agents defend their own interests from the other's actions but from which no collaboration is possible. This is evident in the Prisoner dilemma game where agents’ best actions is to defect which results in a net loss for both parties.   

Due to this problem we study how cooperation can arise in a game and, most importantly, how two agents can interact between themselves to reach a common agreement. This leads to the proposal of a simple two players game we call negotiation where two players can reach a common solution which has interesting properties. In this setting we observe that cooperation arises when there is information scarcity in the game which results in the people's willingness to compromise their own best choice.

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Hai-Jun Zhou